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DICKINSON LAW REVIEWV

POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO PRESCRIBE
RULES OF PRACTICE
As enacted by the General Assembly and approved by the Governor on
June 21, 1937, Act No. 392 is capable of producing complete revision of the
rules of practice in the common pleas courts of Pennsylvania. The provisions of
the act are briefly as follows:
Section 1. The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
by general rule the forms of action, process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and practice and procedure in civil actions at law and in equity
for the courts of common pleas, provided such rules are not inconsistent with provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution; nor
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights of the litigants or
jurisdiction of any court; nor affect any statute of limitations. The
provisions of this section do not apply to oyer and terminer, quarter
sessions, or Orphans Courts. The Supreme Court shall make its rules
effective not less than six months subsequent to adoption. Rules so
adopted will be published by prothonotaries or clerks of county
courts. "From and after the effective date of any rule promulgated
under this section 1, and so long as said rule shall be operative,
the operation of any act of Assembly relating to practice or procedure
in such courts, and inconsistent with such rule, shall be suspended
in so far as such act may be inconsistent with such rule."
Section 2 recognizes the power of common pleas courts to make
rules not inconsistent with Supreme Court rules.
Section 3 and 4 provide that the Supreme Court is empowered to
appoint a Procedural Rules Committee, and that judges, clerks, prothonotaries, and other court officials shall furnish the Supreme Court
any information requested from them.
Section 5 gives the Supreme Court power to prescribe additional
general rules for the purpose of expediting the business of the courts
not otherwise specifically regulated by this act, and for the purpose
of facilitating speedy and proper administration of justice. Rules
regulating admissions to the bar of trial courts are not to be adopted.
Section 6, 7, and 8 provide for repeal of inconsistent acts, severability
of sections in the event that any provision of the act is found to be
unconstitutional, and immediate effectiveness upon final enactment.
Perhaps that part of the act which is most subject to comment is section I
which specifically empowers the court to prescribe rules of practice and provides

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

that the operation of any act of Assembly relating to practice or procedure inconsistent with any rule adopted by the Supreme Court shall be suspended during
the operation of the rule. It is submitted that such a sweeping provision is apt
to lead to a controversy over the question of delegation of powers which necessarily
embraces the question as to whether rule-making is a legislative or judicial function. Many courts have dogmatically laid down, by way of dicta, that the power to
make rules is one which inherently belongs to the courts. Yet, one has merely to
take cognizance of the volume of legislation directly relating to rules of court
practice and procedure to become suspicious of the truthfulness of that dogmatism.
In 1931, a Wisconsin statute (St. 1929, No. 251.18) which contaihed provisions very similar td the Pennsylvania act considered in this discussion, was
held to be constitutional. The court said in conclusion: " . . . It is concluded that
the power to regulate procedure at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
was considered to be essenitally a judicial power, or at least not a strictly legislative
power, and that there is no constitutional objection to the delegation of it to
the courts by the legislature."'
Dean Roscoe Pound recognized the truth of this statement: "Hence, if anything was received from England as a part of our institutions, it was that the
making of these general rules of practice was a judicial function." 2 Dean Pound
corroborates this statement by calling attention to the fact that in 1792 upon inquiry of the Attorney General, the Supreme Court of the United States said that
the practice of the courts of King's Bench and Chancery in England would obtain
for the time being, and "they will, from time to time, make such alterations therein,
In regard to the adoption of rules
as circumstances may render necessary."
by a high tribunal for subordinate courts, it is equally significant that the power
to prescribe rules for nisi prius courts was an immemorial power of superior courts
4
at Westminster.
It would appear, therefore, that the power to prescribe rules of practice and
procedure can be labeled judicial from an historical point of view, 6 and the fact that
legislatures have performed this function for over a century does not afford ground
for any constitutional objection when the legislature chooses to leave judicial
procedure to the courts where it belongs.
It is submitted that the wisdom of the act under discussion cannot be doubted.
The reasons given by Dean John H. Wigmore relative to this matter are inclusive
and convincing: 6 (a) the judiciary is in a position to appreciate the needs; (b)
uln Re Constitutionality of Section 251.18 Wis. Statutes, 236 N. W. 717.
2"The Rule Making Power of the Courts" 12 A. B. A. Journal 599, 601-602; "Regulation of
Judicial Procedure," 10 II. Law Review 171.
32 Dallas 411.
4
Symposium on Rule Making Powers, 6 Oregon Law Review 1, 49.
5Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43; Bank of U. S. v. Halstead. 10 Wheat. 51, 61; State
ex. rel Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court for King Co., 148 Wash. 1; 267 P. 770, 771.
623 Ill. Law Review 276.
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the judiciary is as nearly disinterested as any group could be; (c) the legislature is
hampered by an inferior grade of knowledge; (d) the legislature often becomes
the catspaw of intriguing lawyers; (e) the legislature necessarily can amend rules
of procedure only spasmodically and tardily; and (f) the legislature invariably
amends the rules by patching old rules, so that inconsistency and incompleteness
are often evident.
Therefore, it would seem that the recent legislation is a step in the right
direction which will ultimately result in cleaning up many anomalous situations
which have developed under the series of acts and amendments enacted from
time to time by the Assembly.
S. A. Schreckengaust, Jr.

FURTHER REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF DENTISTRY
One of the crying evils of the dentistry profession, made such by those
with low professional ethics and with little regard for the good name of dentistry
as a whole, has been the vicious and over-emphatic use of advertising media to
lure the unwary into dental chairs. The most severe criticism of such methods has
come from members of the profession itself-from those concerned with the
maintenance of professional standards that would insure both competency of the
practitioner and protection for the more susceptible members of the public. The
end of such deleterious practices has been assured by the passage of the Act of
April 30, 1937, No. 136.

The act is very comprehensive in its listing of forbidden media of advertising,
going beyond those practices heretofore considered as false, misleading or deceptive advertising. The act forbids the employment or use of solicitors or free public
press agents; advertising by means of signs, posters, handbills, circulars, slides,
motion pictures, radio, newspapers, magazines or other publications or advertising
media-(1) professional superiority, (2) the performance of professional services in a superior manner, (3) the character or durability of his work, (4) to
guarantee any dental service, (5) to perform any dental operation painlessly,
(6) prices for professional services, (7) free dental work, (8) free examinations, or
(9) by display of a tooth, teeth, bridge work, or any portion of the human head,
or (10) by means of large, glaring or conspicuous light or other signs: Provided,
however, That the foregoing shall not prevent the use of signs containing the
name of any licensee and the word dentist, or any abbreviation thereof. The penalty provided for violations of the act is suspension or revocation of the license
to practice.
It may well be imagined that those whose practice will be affected most by
these provisions will assert the unconstitutionality of the act. The answer will be

